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Trust as a Skill: Applying Psychological Models of Skill Acquisition to Explain the Social 
Trust Formation Process  
 
Abstract 
This study uses psychological models of skill acquisition to explain how social trust is formed. 
We view trust as being shaped by four factors: crystallized, cognitive, contact, and context. We 
combine these four factors into a 4C-component analytical model by establishing links between 
them and explaining the rationale behind their individual and joint effects on trust. The proposed 
model is tested with the PIAAC public-use data. Both theoretical and empirical elaborations 
suggest that context is the strongest driver of trust formation. Good contexts also spur more trust 
when individuals already possess crystallized knowledge and can display faith in others. Such 
knowledge can be learned if it is missing, but how efficiently depends on the quality of one’s 
cognitive system, frequency of contacts with others, and the distance between one’s actual 
knowledge of trust and the optimal trust level for the given context. 
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Trust as a Skill: Applying Psychological Models of Skill Acquisition to Explain the Social 
Trust Formation Process 
 
 
Research has recently equated social trust with a skill that brings a return to individuals 
and is worth investing in (Keeley, 2007; OECD, 2001). This approach reverses the conventional 
understanding of trust as a relatively stable attribute, shaped early in the socialization process 
(Fukuyama, 2000) and remaining largely constant throughout one’s life. New perspectives on 
trust building suggest that trust can be learned or forgotten and may fluctuate depending on 
factors that conventionally determine an individual’s stock of knowledge or skills.  
This research applies psychological models of skill acquisition to social trust formation 
processes. We argue that if trust is a skill, then the psychological base models of learning can 
provide valuable insights into how trust develops and establish factors that determine trust levels 
among individuals. Our study offers a set of four predictors that may largely explain cross-
individual and cross-country variations in trust levels. We distinguish between crystallized, 
cognitive, contact, and contextual components of trust. We combine the four components into a 
4C-component analytical model by establishing links between them and explaining the rationale 
behind their individual and joint effects on trust. The proposed model is tested with the PIAAC 
data while using a conventional definition of trust, faith in people.  
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Literature Overview  
According to psychological models of skill acquisition, a skill formation starts with general 
knowledge that experience gradually transforms into more specialized knowledge, a so called 
skill (Anderson, 1982). The brain records general knowledge through mental representations that 
specify actions required to adequately perform a task (McCormick, 1976) and that are augmented 
with (a) preconditions for carrying out each action and (b) a representation of each action’s 
outcomes (Taatgen, Huss, Dickison and Anderson, 2008). These mental representations are 
stored in the declarative memory so that the action’s knowledge is available upon request 
(Anderson, 1987). The procedural memory maps the retrieved knowledge onto an action 
(Anderson, 2007; Taatgen et al., 2008).  
Selecting a mental representation to map onto an action is a complex process largely 
governed by the environment or context (Prinz, 1997). The environment cues a needed mental 
representation that is then retrieved from one’s memory (Prinz, 1997). The individual interacts 
with the environment through the perceptual system by collecting perceptual input (Prinz ,1997). 
The brain uses this perceptual input to align the observed contextual conditions with the 
preconditions and outcomes of available mental representations (Taatgen et al., 2008). The 
mental representation whose preconditions and expected outcomes match the perceptual input is 
selected for mapping onto an action (Taatgen, 2005; Taatgen et al., 2008).  
When a match is found, the brain creates a primitive rule, also called a production, that 
links the perceived input to the action. The production specifies (1) the circumstances under 
which it can be applied, and (2) an action (what should be done when this production is applied). 
Since action choice requires numerous mental operations (the retrieval of mental representation 
(knowledge) from declarative memory, adding it to the procedural memory, testing this 
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knowledge for applicability, and linking this knowledge to the action), the brain combines 
several productions to simplify this process and directly associates perception and action. 
Productions that fire in sequence are united into a single production through a production 
compilation mechanism (Anderson, 1982, 2004). For instance, if the first production uses 
perception to make a request to declarative memory, whereas the second production uses the 
retrieved fact to perform an action, then the production compilation process encodes the two 
operations into a single rule that links the perception directly to the action (Taatgen et al., 2008). 
The action choice is now faster since the process of retrieving knowledge from the declarative 
memory is bypassed (Anderson, 1982; Taatgen, 2005; Taatgen et al., 2008). 
The new production, which links the contextual properties to the action, will be used only 
when it has a high utility value (Taatgen et al., 2008). The first time a production is created, its 
utility value is set to zero, but it usually increases whenever this production is recreated 
(Anderson, 1982; Taatgen et al., 2008). Once the new production is recreated enough times, its 
utility value nears the old production’s utility value, ensuring that the new production is likely to 
persist (Anderson, 1982; Taatgen et al., 2008). The utility value accumulates slowly (as it is a 
learning process), because the new production must be recreated many times, and it represents a 
function of how frequently the production is recreated.  
Therefore, psychology defines skills as a set of environmentally structured productions 
(Taatgen et al., 2008). This environment-driven approach to action choice has two limits 
concerning the action’s definition. First, information about the context is unavailable or one is 
unable to evaluate sufficient contextual properties. The choice of action is then governed by the 
individual’s internal state/understanding of the world (Taatgen, 2007). Psychological models of 
skill acquisition use the minimal control principle to balance the context with the individual’s 
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internal worldview. When possible, control is derived from the environment/context, or bottom 
up. The top down approach, derived from the internal state/worldview, is used only when 
necessary (Taatgen, 2007). The second problem is that the declarative memory might lack a 
mental representation with the preconditions and outcomes that match the perceived input. In this 
case, experiments show that participants simply discover the relevant knowledge of action by 
drawing analogies from their existing knowledge (Anderson, 1982) or by taking a random action 
(Taatgen et al., 2008). If they perceive that this action brings them closer to the goal, a new 
record is created with the original perceptual state as a precondition and the resulting perceptual 
state as a post-condition (Taatgen et al., 2008).  
In sum, the psychological models of skill acquisition suggest that individuals select the 
knowledge of action largely based on the contextual properties in which they are placed. When 
missing, the needed knowledge can be learned with the learning process’s efficiency depending 
on one’s current stock of knowledge, quality of one’s cognitive system, and frequency with 
which the new knowledge is recreated. 
 
Analytical Model 
We use the psychological understanding of skill acquisition to explain how trust emerges. Our 
main premise is that exhibiting a certain level of trust is an action. If this is the case, one can 
argue that trust is influenced by four forces, with each forming a corresponding component of 
trust: 
(1) A Crystallized Component (the first CC) represents one’s knowledge of various trust 
levels that can be exhibited towards others under certain circumstances. It takes the 
form of mental representations stored in one’s declarative memory or its buffers. This 
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knowledge derives both from cultures prevalent in one’s society and one’s personal 
experience with trusting others. 
(2) A Contextual Component (the second CC) consists of the contextual properties that 
individuals perceive and use for matching preconditions and outcomes of mental 
representations to determine which knowledge should be mapped onto an action.  
(3) A Cognitive Component (the third CC) refers to the individual’s general cognitive 
abilities to perceive, process, and record information, such as declarative memory, 
procedural memory, processing speed, etc. This component is expected to predefine 
the quality and the speed of one’s mental operations and hence the efficiency of an 
individual’s matching and learning processes.  
(4) A Contact Component (the fourth CC) reflects the frequency with which the 
individual is in contact with others in the given context. Since we focus on trust 
towards other people, we believe that the interaction with others determines how 
frequently the new operator is recreated that links the context’s perceived properties 
to the optimal trust action.  
The trust formation process can be modeled by combining the four C-components as 
follows (see Figure 1). An individual needs to choose the level of trust to display towards other 
individuals in a certain context. The contextual properties are observable. The individual is 
endowed with a cognitive system of a certain quality and with a crystallized component 
consisting of mental representations that each store knowledge about how much trust to exhibit 
towards other people. Formed through cultural and personal experiences with others, each of the 
available mental representations is augmented with (a) the preconditions under which a certain 
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level of trust should be displayed and (b) the representation of expected outcomes that exhibiting 
this level of trust under the given circumstances leads to.  
 
Figure 1 near here 
 
In deciding how much to trust others, the individual evaluates their context and collects 
information about the context’s properties. This perceptual input is matched with the 
preconditions and outcomes of mental representations already crystallized by the brain. A mental 
representation is selected when preconditions and expected outcomes match the perceived input. 
The mental representation’s inherent trust level is displayed by creating a new production that 
links the context’s current properties to a certain level of social trust. Through contacts with 
others, the new production is recreated as many times as this context requires to establish trust. 
This augments the new production’s utility value and makes this particular trust level the 
automatic response to the given contextual characteristics. If no match is found, the individual 
randomly selects a trust level to display. This trust level derives from the individual’s worldview 
and their experience with trusting others. The individual analyzes the action’s results by 
juxtaposing the outcomes of having displayed a randomly selected trust level with their personal 
goals. If the chosen level of trust brings the individual closer to their goals, a new record or 
operator is created with the original perceptual state as a precondition and the resulting 
perceptual state as a post-condition. If this is not the case, the random selection process is 
repeated until a match is found. 
We use the trust formation description above to establish links between the four 
components and explain peculiarities in their joint impact on trust.  
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Proposition 1: We expect the context to be the strongest predictor of social trust levels. 
The principle of minimal control is the key rationale behind this expectation, according to which 
the contextual component’s properties are more important in forming trust than the individual’s 
internal representation of the world. One’s understanding of the world, as shaped by the culture 
or experience with others, can influence trust formation when information about the context is 
unavailable or one is unable to evaluate sufficient contextual properties. 
Proposition 2: We expect that context impacts trust more strongly when individuals 
already trust others. Our point of departure is that good contexts activate mental representations 
containing high trust levels. In order for the brain to activate such a mental representation, it 
must already exist in the declarative memory or its buffers. If the brain has not yet crystallized a 
mental representation of the trust level required for this context, it may take longer before the 
right trust level is reached and stored as a new record. Establishing a new record can be a slow 
process, since it involves learning by randomly selecting trust levels and analyzing each action’s 
consequences. Random selection may involve errors and is unlikely to lead immediately to the 
optimal trust level. For any given context, activating existing mental representations hence 
produces a more optimal trust level than choosing a trust level through random selection. When 
placed in a good context, individuals who display high trust are more likely to choose the right 
trust level than individuals who lack such experience. 
Proposition 3: We expect the trust building process to be more efficient for individuals 
who possess the knowledge of trust that is closer to the optimal trust level for the given context. 
Any new knowledge of trust is usually derived by drawing analogies from the individual’s 
existing knowledge (Keil, 1989; Wittenbrink, Hilton and Gist, 1998). This means that a sudden 
leap from distrust to complete trust is unlikely to occur for individuals who lack experience in 
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displaying high trust levels towards other people. Rather, trust levels gradually increase as more 
and more trust is displayed.  
Proposition 4: We expect that the context’s impact on trust is stronger for individuals 
with a more developed cognitive system. Action choice includes numerous mental operations 
(perceiving the context’s current state, processing the perceived information, matching the 
perceived contextual characteristics to mental representations’ preconditions and outcomes, 
creating a new production, etc.). As such, an individual’s general cognitive abilities may 
determine how fast and how well the brain performs mental operations that underlie the 
matching, coupling, mapping, and learning processes required to create a new production. 
Mental operations are usually faster and more efficient for individuals who possess better 
cognition. Hence, improving contexts will have a greater impact on trust for such individuals. 
Proposition 5: We expect that the context’s positive impact on trust is stronger for 
individuals who interact more frequently with others in this context. This is because a new 
production is used when it has a high utility value. The production’s utility value is a function of 
how often the new production is recreated. This, in turn, depends on the number of incidents that 
require trust in the given context. Since we define social trust as trust towards other individuals, 
the need to trust others obviously emerges when individuals interact with each other. We propose 
that the new context’s impact on trust is stronger for individuals with more social contacts.  
We use the above propositions to postulate the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The contextual component is expected to be the strongest determinant of 
trust. 
Hypothesis 2: The context’s positive impact on trust is expected to be stronger for 
individuals who have a more developed crystallized component. 
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Hypothesis 3: The context’s positive impact on trust is expected to be weaker for 
individuals who have a larger distance between the current knowledge of trust and the 
optimal trust level. 
Hypothesis 4:  The context’s positive impact on trust is expected to be stronger for 
individuals who have a more developed cognitive system. 
Hypothesis 5: The context’s positive impact on trust is expected to be stronger for 
individuals who have a more developed contact component.  
 
Data and Methods Description  
To test our hypotheses, we utilize the public-use data from the Programme for the International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) conducted in 2012. This database is unique 
because it provides a great number of skill relevant variables while also containing the measure 
of social trust (see https://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/surveyofadultskills.htm for a more detailed 
description of the PIAAC survey). Our sample includes Belgium (Flanders), the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom (England and Northern Ireland), and the USA. Australia, Austria and Canada are 
excluded from the analysis since data for many variables used in the analysis are not made 
available in the public-use dataset for these countries.  
We utilize the following set of variables to empirically test our hypotheses (see Table 1 
for descriptive statistics). 
 
Table 1 near here 
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Dependent Variable  
We limit our trust operationalisation to the faith in others measured through the extent to which 
the respondents agree with the statement that they can only trust a few people completely. The 
response scale varies from 1 “strongly agree” to 5 “strongly disagree.” 
 
Independent Variables  
The crystallized component is operationalised through one’s current stock of knowledge to trust 
and one’s attitudes towards acquiring new knowledge. The knowledge to trust variable is 
approximated by the individual’s participation in volunteering since volunteering helps an 
individual develop the knowledge of reciprocity, cooperation, empathy for others, an 
understanding of the common interest and common good and, as a result, trust (Brehm and Rahn, 
1997; Newton, 1999a, 1999b; Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1995, 2000). One’s participation in 
volunteering is measured through the question asking how often the respondent did voluntary 
work in the last 12 months. The responses vary from 1 “never” to 5 “every day.” One’s attitudes 
towards acquiring knowledge approximate how the individual acquires new knowledge of trust. 
This measure represents a synthetic variable constructed through summing up the responses to 
six questions about the extent to which the respondent agrees with the following statements: (1) 
When I learn or read about new ideas, I try to relate them to real life situations to which they 
might apply, (2) I like learning new things, (3) When I come across something new, I try to 
relate it to what I already know, (4) I like to get to the bottom of difficult things, (5) I like to 
figure out how different ideas fit together, and (6) If I do not understand something, I look for 
additional information to make it clearer. The final construct has values ranging between 6 and 
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30, with higher values corresponding to a greater subjective propensity to learn or to integrate 
new information.  
The cognitive component is operationalised through general intelligence and formal 
education. The general intelligence variable is measured by averaging the cognitive test results in 
the areas of literacy and numeracy, as in Blau and Kahn (2005). Each of the two constructs is 
calculated as a mean for ten possible values that the PIAAC survey provides. The education 
variable captures one’s investment in formal education and is operationalised through a dummy 
that takes the value of one if the respondent has completed more than high school.  
The contact component captures the frequency of interactions with other individuals. 
Since the PIAAC survey does not provide any questions relevant to meeting people outside job, 
we limit the contact variable to one’s contacts at workplace. Additionally, we select only those 
contacts in which the individual has an active role while also distinguishing between positive and 
negative types of contacts. Positive contacts are measured through a synthetic variable 
constructed by summing up responses to questions about the frequency with which the 
respondents declare (1) instructing, training or teaching people, individually or in groups, (2) 
making speeches or giving presentations in front of five or more people, and (3) planning the 
activities of others. Negative contacts combine active interactions with other individuals 
involving, however, certain resistance on the part of others, such as (1) selling a product or 
selling a service, (2) advising people, (3) persuading or influencing people, and (4) negotiating 
with people either inside or outside one’s firm or organization. Each of the questions has a 
response scale varying from 1 “never” to 5 “every day.” 
The contextual component is operationalised through the quality of a country’s political 
context, a respondent’s job context, and working hours flexibility. The political context variable 
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reflects the quality of the country’s institutional environment. Formal institutions are deemed to 
be conducive to establishing trust, since they enforce third-party agreements (Herreros and 
Criado, 2008), enable individuals to pursue redress and restitution when cheated (Rothstein and 
Stolle, 2001), and serve as a safety net (Farrell, 2005). We operationalize this variable through 
the extent to which the respondent agrees with the statement “People like me do not have any say 
about what the government does.” The response scale ranges between 1 “strongly agree” and 5 
“strongly disagree.”  
The job context narrows the concept of environment to workplace. Workplace 
characteristics reflect the attributes of an individual’s environment and provide the individual 
with experiences that can be interpreted as general social norms, thereby influencing trust 
towards other people (Grund and Harbring, 2009). The job context variable is operationalised 
through the question in which the respondents need to self-rate their satisfaction with job by 
choosing between the value of 1 “extremely dissatisfied” and 5 “extremely satisfied.”  
Working hours flexibility is expected to capture the degree of control at the workplace (as 
in Grund and Harbring, 2009). More regulation of working hours reflects more control at the 
workplace, whereas control may teach individuals not to rely on trust (only), but on institutional 
mechanisms as mistrust is a dominant pattern (Grund and Harbring, 2009). This variable is 
operationalized through the question asking the extent to which the individual can choose or 
change working hours. The response scale varies from 1 “not at all” to 5 “to a very high extent.”  
 
Control Variables 
We control for the conventional determinants of trust (as in Christoforou, 2004; Hall, 1999; Van 
Oorschot and Arts, 2005), such as respondents’ employment status, age, health condition, living 
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with a spouse or partner, the presence of children in the household, and immigration status. 
One’s employment status is captured by a dummy that takes the value of one if the respondent 
declares having a paid job. The respondents’ age is measured in ten-year bands. Health condition 
is measured through a question asking respondents to self-rate their health status by using a scale 
varying between 1 “poor” and 5 “excellent.”  The living with a spouse or partner variable is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if the respondent declares living with a spouse or partner. The 
presence of children in the household dummy takes the value of one if the respondent declares 
that the household has at least one child. Immigration status is captured by a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the respondent was born in the country where the survey was 
conducted. We also include mother’s level of education to capture the quality of one’s early 
socialization processes.  
 
Methods Used in the Analysis 
We use a multilevel analysis as our main method since it accounts for our data’s hierarchical 
structure (Kreft and de Leeuw, 1998; Snijders and Bosker, 1999). This is necessary to prevent 
the un-modeled country information from ending up all being pooled into the single individual 
error term or recognize the fact that the regression coefficient on individual-level variables may 
not apply equally to all countries (Luke, 2004). The base model takes the following form:  
Trustij = γ00 + γ10Crystalyzed_Cij + γ20Cognitive_Cij + γ30Contact_Cij + γ40Context_Cij + 
γ50X+ m0j + εij                                                                                     (1) 
Here, Trust is social trust scores, Crystalyzed_C is the measure of the crystallized 
component, Cognitive_C  is the measure of cognitive component, Contact_C  is the 
operationalisation of the contact component, Context_C  is the contextual trust component. X is 
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the set of individual-level control variables; m is the country-level variance, whereas ε is the 
individual- level variance.  
We further augment the base model by including interaction terms between the 
contextual component and the three other trust components as follows: 
Trustij = γ00 + γ10Crystalyzed_Cij + γ20Cognitive_Cij + γ30Contact_Cij + γ40Context_Cij + 
γ50D_to_Crystalyzed_Cij + γ60Crystalyzed_C*Context_Cij + γ70 Cognitive_C*Context_Cij + 
γ80Contact_C*Context_Cij + γ90D_to_Crystalyzed_C* Context_Cij + γ100X + m0j + εij,    (2) 
where Trust is trust scores, Crystalyzed_C, Cognitive_C, Contact_C, and Context_C are 
the measures of the four trust components as described above. D_to_Crystalyzed_C is the 
measure of the distance between the respondents’ crystallized component and the optimal values 
on the crystallized component. It is calculated as: [(Optimal level - Respondent’s value on the 
crystallized component items) / Respondent’s value on the crystallized component items]. 
Norway’s mean values for the crystallized component items are considered to be optimal levels. 
The calculated values on the distance variables are rescaled to change between 0 “minimal 
distance” to 1 “maximum distance.” Crystalyzed_C*Context_C, Cognitive_C*Context_C 
Contact_C*Context_C, and D_to_Crystalyzed_C* Context_C are the interaction terms between 
the contextual component and the four other variables that are (sequentially) included in the base 
model. Again, X is the set of individual-level control variables; m is the country-level variance 
and ε is the individual-level variance. The STATA gllamm command is utilized to calculate the 
model’s parameters. Since social trust is an ordinal variable, the ologit link is specified together 
with the binomial family sub-options. Additionally, we include the GLLAMM adapt option, 
which causes adaptive quadrature to be used instead of ordinary quadrature. 
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Empirical Results 
The base model’s results are consistent with the conventional understanding of trust formation 
processes (see Table 2). Employment and better health condition are both associated with higher 
trust levels (Hall, 1999; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Trust increases with age (Christoforou, 
2004). Trust levels are also higher for individuals who are married or live with a partner and for 
individuals who were born in the country where the survey was conducted (Christoforou, 2004; 
Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). Trust is more difficult to form among individuals with children 
(Hall, 1999; Van Oorschot and Arts, 2005). We also find a negative association between 
mother’s education level and one’s trust scores.  
Augmenting the base model with the four components provides support for the 4C-
component model of trust formation (see Table 3). Individuals who participate in volunteer 
activities have a greater understanding of trust and tend to exhibit higher trust levels. 
Surprisingly, individuals inclined towards acquiring new knowledge have lower trust levels. 
More able individuals or individuals with better formal education prove to be more trusting. 
Positive contacts, even through job tasks, lead to higher trust levels, whereas negative contacts 
relate to lower trust levels. The three contextual variables capturing the general political and job 
environments prove to be strong positive determinants of social trust.  
 
Table 2 and Table 3 near here 
 
The model’s fit changes the most when the contextual variables are included. This is 
commensurate with Hypothesis 1 and suggests that the context is the driving force behind trust 
formation among individuals. Positive changes in the context’s quality are a lower constraint to 
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substantial trust changes. Only when the context improves do individuals considerably increase 
their trust level. These results do not change after applying the selected strategies of robustness 
check, such as (1) overcoming limitations of the PIAAC survey regarding available 
operationalisations through constructing a single measure for each of the four components (see 
Annex A), (2) controlling for sample size variations (see Annex B), or (3) controlling for 
endogeneity in the relationship between the four components and social trust (see Annex C). 
Our analysis also shows strong interaction effects between the context and the three other 
components (see Table 4). We view this as evidence that learning to trust has an upper 
constraint, which is formed by the crystallized, cognitive, and contact components and which 
determines the individual’s responses to contextual improvements. When one’s current 
knowledge includes trusting others a lot, considerable changes in the context spur considerable 
changes in trust levels. When such knowledge is missing, even substantial improvements in the 
context only modestly impact one’s trust scores, which is commensurate with Hypothesis 2. Our 
results also suggest that the final change in trust levels may depend on the distance between the 
individual’s current knowledge to trust and the level of trust which is optimal for good contexts. 
As the distance increases, the positive change in trust levels due to contextual improvements 
declines. This is in line with Hypothesis 3.  
Additionally, the context’s overall impact on trust scores proves greater for more able 
individuals with higher cognitive abilities or better educational backgrounds, which is 
commensurate with Hypothesis 4. Finally, the frequency of contacts significantly influences 
contextual variables’ impact on trust, with both positive and negative contacts enhancing this 
impact, which is in line with Hypothesis 5. One should note that the negative contacts’ role in 
trust emergence is relatively small compared to that of positive contacts.  
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Table 4 near here 
 
To further analyze the components’ joint effect on social trust, we group countries 
according to their four components’ values and link them to trust levels. To facilitate this country 
comparison and overcome limitations of the PIAAC survey regarding available 
operationalisations, we use the STATA predict option for factor analysis and construct a single 
measure for each of the four components. This option allows us to capture the commonalities in 
the variation of sub-measures selected for each trust facet and to combine them into a single 
construct that better reflects the rationale behind each trust component (see Annex A  for the 
regression with the trust components’ single measures).  
Applying the hierarchical cluster analysis to the single measures allows us to distinguish 
between six country groups (see Figure 2). The first encompasses Scandinavian countries and the 
USA, where all of the four components take high values, resulting in the sample’s highest trust 
level. The second group consists of Ireland and the UK with high values on the crystallized and 
contact components, relatively lower values on the cognitive and contextual components, and 
trust reaching only moderate levels. The third group includes Japan and Korea with low 
crystallized item values and a limited frequency of contacts. However, these countries are 
characterized by good cognition levels and educational attainments and relatively strong political 
and occupational environments, leading to average trust levels. The fourth group includes 
Southern European countries (Spain and Italy), where each of the four components have low 
values, resulting in the sample’s lowest trust level. The fifth group has continental European 
countries (Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands) and Estonia, which are characterized by a 
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rich tradition of volunteering and job tasks that offer frequent contacts. The cognitive and 
contextual components predominantly take average values, resulting in average trust levels. The 
sixth group includes post-socialist economies (the Czech Republic, the Russian Federation, 
Poland, and the Slovak Republic) together with France. These countries lack a tradition of 
volunteering and have job sectors offering fewer contacts but are characterized with average 
values on the cognitive and context components, resulting in an average trust level. Figure 3 
presents a four dimensional visualization of this country grouping, whereas Table 5 reports the 
four components’ average values by country group. 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 near here 
 
Table 5 near here 
 
To analyze how the three trust components can constrain an increase in a country’s trust 
levels when the context improves, we conduct a prediction exercise in which we assign the 
highest value to the contextual component’s items and keep the three other components’ 
measures at their actual levels. The predictions are made using the STATA gllapred option (for 
more details see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008). This procedure presupposes first conducting 
a multilevel analysis of actual trust scores and then calculating the marginal cumulative 
probability. We calculate a mean value of such predictions for each country and report them in 
Table 6 as compared to the actual trust score. To simplify the visualization of our results, we 
create a binary variable for trust by assigning the value of one when the initial trust measure 
takes the value of four or five and otherwise assigning the value of zero.  
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Table 6 about here 
 
Our results reveal two things. First, when everyone has the same high value for the 
context, the initially found cross-country and cross-group differences in trust levels almost 
vanish. This confirms that context drives trust formation processes. Second, even if everyone in 
the selected countries has equally positive perceptions of government effectiveness or the quality 
of work contexts, trust scores still remain slightly heterogeneous across the six groups. This 
supports our proposition that the development of the three other components impacts social trust 
responsiveness when the context improves. With the four components’ best values, group one 
has the highest predicted trust scores whereas group four, with the lowest component values, has 
the lowest predicted trust scores. Interestingly, our results indicate that groups with a developed 
or relatively developed tradition of volunteering (group two and group five), combined with a 
high frequency of contacts, will improve trust scores to a greater extent than groups lacking a 
volunteer tradition, but with relatively good investments in formal education (group three and 
group six). Nonetheless, both types of groups remain behind Scandinavian countries and the 
USA in their predicted trust levels.  
Overall, both our country grouping and the prediction exercise suggest that the four 
components must all have good values to lead to high trust levels. When there are imbalances in 
their level of maturation, the highest trust level cannot be attained. Countries with more 
developed crystallized and contact components have more opportunities to promote trust 
formation by improving their context than do countries lacking a volunteer tradition, but with 
good investments in the population’s cognitive development.  
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Conclusion  
This study offers a new trust formation model by utilizing psychology’s skill acquisition 
framework. Accordingly, trust consists of four components: (1) the crystallized component, the 
current stock of knowledge regarding trust levels to display towards others, (2) the cognitive 
component, the quality of one’s cognitive system, (3) the contact component, the frequency with 
which one interacts with others, and (4) the contextual component, the environmental quality 
where decisions about trust levels are made.  
Our theoretical and empirical work suggests that context is the most important predictor 
of trust. Positive changes in the context’s properties are needed to significantly increase trust in 
society. However, contextual improvements lead people to be more trusting when they are 
already knowledgeable about displaying high trust levels. If such knowledge is missing, then 
trust can be learned, just as a skill. The efficiency of the learning process is determined by the 
distance between the current knowledge of trust and the optimal level of trust. Additionally, 
learning to trust in a new institutional context is easier for more intelligent individuals and is a 
function of how often individuals are in contact with others. 
This study has considerable policy implications. Our model can be used to analyze the 
consequences of the current immigration phenomenon in Europe. According to our model, one 
can expect that immigrants from weak political and legal environments will upgrade their trust 
levels when they move to more advanced EU societies. But the new level of trust is still likely to 
be below the typical trust levels for these countries’ native population. To ensure social cohesion 
in countries accepting many new residents, it is essential to overcome barriers to immigrants’ 
social trust, such as lower levels of education, weak contact patterns in the new place of 
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residence and reluctance in trusting others, common for many economically underdeveloped or 
developing countries. Governments should simultaneously address the four trust factors to 
increase trust levels among immigrants.  
Further research is needed to validate our model. Longitudinal data is necessary to test 
how dynamically the four factors impact trust formation. It is also essential to clarify what 
contextual characteristics (institutional, social, political, or other) are important for trust building 
and how each of these characteristics can change the trust formation process’s trajectory.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for the Key Variables Used in the Analysis 
VARIABLES N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Social trust 98,729 1.000 5.000 2.300 1.138 
Knowledge to trust 98,729 1.000 5.000 1.600 1.011 
Attitudes towards knowledge  98,729 6.000 30.000 21.580 4.542 
General intelligence 98,729 37.870 426.120 271.558 45.547 
Formal education 98,729 0.000 1.000 0.560 0.496 
Positive contacts 98,729 3.000 15.000 5.731 3.429 
Negative contacts 98,729 4.000 20.000 9.412 5.346 
Political context 98,729 1.000 5.000 2.720 1.266 
Job context 98,729 1.000 5.000 3.330 0.841 
Working hours flexibility 98,729 1.000 5.000 2.110 1.392 
Employed  98,729 0.000 1.000 0.670 0.469 
Age  98,729 1.000 5.000 3.040 1.420 
Subjective health status 98,729 1.000 5.000 2.600 1.070 
Living with a spouse or a partner 98,729 0.000 1.000 0.670 0.470 
Children in the household  98,729 0.000 1.000 0.610 0.487 
Born in the country 98,729 0.000 1.000 0.910 0.292 
Mother’s education level 98,729 0.000 1.000 0.559 0.496 
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     Table 2. Social Trust Base Model  
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
   
Employed (1=yes)  0.140*** 
  (0.013) 
Age  0.053*** 
  (0.006) 
Subjective health status  0.174*** 
  (0.006) 
Living with a spouse or a partner  0.122*** 
  (0.016) 
Children in the household   -0.153*** 
  (0.017) 
Born in the country  0.179*** 
  (0.021) 
Mother’s education level   -0.111*** 
  (0.012) 
Constant   
Cut 1 -1.146*** -1.289*** 
 (0.104) (0.052) 
Cut 2 0.817*** 0.748*** 
 (0.104) (0.052) 
Cut 3 1.419*** 1.366*** 
 (0.104) (0.052) 
Cut 4 3.218*** 3.203*** 
 (0.105) (0.054) 
Log likelihood -166523.72 -133567.48 
Between-class variance  0.234  0.268 
 (0.069) (0.051) 
Number of level 2 units 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 98,729 98,729 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Table 3. A 4C-Component Model of Trust Formation 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
The crystallized component        
Knowledge to trust  0.143***     0.091*** 
 (0.006)     (0.006) 
Attitudes towards knowledge 0.011***     -0.021*** 
 (0.001)     (0.002) 
Distance to knowledge to trust  -0.427***     
  (0.017)     
Distance to attitudes towards  -0.475***     
knowledge  (0.057)     
The cognition component        
General intelligence    0.005***   0.004*** 
   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Formal education    0.290***   0.210*** 
   (0.018)   (0.019) 
The contact component        
Positive contacts    0.054***  0.033*** 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
Negative contacts    -0.003*  -0.012*** 
    (0.002)  (0.002) 
The context component        
Political context     0.395*** 0.369*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
Job context     0.102*** 0.101*** 
     (0.009) (0.009) 
Working hours flexibility      0.046*** 0.032*** 
     (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant       
Cut 1 -0.825*** -1.683*** 0.434*** -1.041*** -0.587*** 0.027 
 (0.076) (0.052) (0.055) (0.043) (0.061) (0.077) 
Cut 2 1.222*** 0.366*** 2.501*** 1.007*** 1.548*** 2.187*** 
 (0.076) (0.052) (0.055) (0.043) (0.061) (0.078) 
Cut 3 1.844*** 0.988*** 3.129*** 1.627*** 2.188*** 2.835*** 
 (0.076) (0.052) (0.056) (0.044) (0.062) (0.078) 
Cut 4 3.691*** 2.836*** 4.983*** 3.472*** 4.075*** 4.739*** 
 (0.078) (0.054) (0.058) (0.046) (0.063) (0.079) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -132140.31 -132081.33 -132552.61 -132584.80 -129509.90 -127442.24 
Between-class variance  0.278  0.222 0.229  0.229  0.430  0.403  
 (0.056) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.033) 
Number of level 2 units 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 98,729 98,729 98,729 98,729 98,729 98,729 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The list of controls includes the full set of variables from the social trust base 
model. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Table 4. Analysis of Interaction Effects between the Four Trust Components  
 VARIABLES Interaction terms 
Interactions between the context and crystallized components   
Political context * Knowledge to trust 0.013*** 
 (0.004) 
Political context * Attitudes towards knowledge  0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Job context * Knowledge to trust 0.005 
 (0.004) 
Job context * Attitudes towards knowledge 0.004*** 
 (0.001) 
Working hours flexibility * Knowledge to trust 0.007* 
 (0.004) 
Working hours flexibility * Attitudes towards knowledge 0.002** 
 (0.000) 
Interactions between the context and the distance to the crystallized component   
Political context * Distance to knowledge  -0.038*** 
 (0.013) 
Political context * Distance to attitudes -0.019 
 (0.090) 
Job context * Distance to knowledge -0.028 
 (0.017) 
Job context * Distance to attitudes -0.105* 
 (0.058) 
Working hours flexibility * Distance to knowledge -0.032* 
 (0.018) 
Working hours flexibility * Distance to attitudes -0.080 
 (0.087) 
Interactions between the context and cognitive components  
Political context * General intelligence -0.000 
 (0.001) 
Political context * Formal education  0.024** 
 (0.012) 
Job context * General intelligence 0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Job context * Formal education  0.070*** 
 (0.009) 
Working hours flexibility * General intelligence 0.001*** 
 (0.000) 
Working hours flexibility * Formal education  0.065*** 
 (0.012) 
Interactions between the context and contact components  
Political context * Positive contacts  0.007*** 
 (0.001) 
Political context * Negative contacts  0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
Job context * Positive contacts 0.009*** 
 (0.001) 
Job context * Negative contacts 0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
Working hours flexibility * Positive contacts 0.003*** 
 (0.001) 
Working hours flexibility * Negative contacts 0.000 
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 (0.001) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Table 5. The Four Components’ Mean Values, by Country Group  
 Group 1 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
USA  
Group 2 
 
Ireland 
UK 
Group 3 
 
Japan  
Korea 
Group 4 
 
Italy  
Spain 
Group 5 
 
Belgium 
Estonia 
Germany 
Netherlands  
Group 6 
 
Czech Rep. 
France 
Poland 
Russian 
Fed 
Slovak 
Rep. 
T
h
e 
 
C
ry
st
a
ll
iz
ed
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
Knowledge to 
trust 
 
 
1.9 
(High) 
1.7 
(High) 
1.5 
(Low) 
1.4 
(Low) 
1.7 
(High) 
1.4 
(Low) 
Attitudes 
towards 
knowledge  
 
 
23.2 
(High) 
22.0 
(High) 
17.6 
(Low) 
22.4 
(High) 
20.8 
(Average) 
21.7 
(Relatively 
Average) 
T
h
e 
 
C
o
g
n
it
iv
e 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
General 
intelligence  
 
 
277 
(High) 
265 
(Relatively 
Low) 
280 
(High) 
250 
(Low) 
277 
(Average) 
271 
(Average) 
Formal 
education  
 
 
0.81 
(High) 
0.74 
(Relatively 
Low) 
0.82 
(High) 
0.56 
(Low) 
0.78 
(Average) 
0.83 
(High) 
T
h
e 
 
C
o
n
ta
ct
 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
Positive 
contacts  
6.8 
(High) 
6.0 
(High) 
5.5 
(Relatively 
Low) 
5.2 
(Low) 
5.6 
(Relatively 
high) 
5.0 
(Low) 
Negative 
contacts  
 
 
10.7 
(High) 
10.0 
(High) 
8.8 
(Low) 
8.2 
(Low) 
9.6 
(Relatively 
High) 
8.6 
(Low) 
T
h
e 
 
C
o
n
te
x
tu
a
l 
C
o
m
p
o
n
en
t 
Political 
context 
3.2 
(High) 
2.6 
(Relatively 
Low) 
2.8 
(Relatively 
High) 
2.2 
(Low) 
2.7 
(Average) 
2.7 
(Average) 
Job context 
 
 
2.4 
(High) 
1.9 
(Average) 
1.8 
(Average) 
1.6 
(Low) 
2.1 
(Average) 
1.8 
(Average) 
Working hours 
flexibility  
 
2.5 
(High) 
1.9  
(Relatively 
Low) 
2.3 
(Relatively 
High) 
1.8 
(Low) 
2.2 
(Average) 
1.8 
(Low) 
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Table 6. Marginal Cumulative Probabilities of Trusting Other People Derived from the 4C-
Component Trust Model  
Countries Trust scores 
Actual Predicted 
Clustered by 
country 
Clustered by 
country group 
Group 1 0.348 0.418 0.414 
Denmark 0.463 0.415 0.415 
Finland 0.342 0.426 0.422 
Norway 0.354 0.417 0.415 
Sweden 0.357 0.420 0.417 
USA 0.224 0.411 0.403 
Group 2 0.172 0.410 0.409 
Ireland 0.166 0.413 0.413 
UK 0.178 0.407 0.405 
Group 3 0.160 0.379 0.381 
Japan  0.190 0.398 0.400 
Korea 0.129 0.360 0.362 
Group 4 0.156 0.375 0.377 
Italy  0.099 0.378 0.379 
Spain 0.212 0.371 0.375 
Group 5 0.190 0.397 0.397 
Belgium 0.183 0.404 0.405 
Estonia 0.095 0.374 0.372 
Germany 0.157 0.404 0.403 
Netherlands 0.323 0.407 0.409 
Group 6 0.125 0.392 0.389 
Czech Rep. 0.072 0.398 0.396 
France 0.107 0.399 0.394 
Poland 0.164 0.390 0.386 
Russian Fed 0.185 0.377 0.377 
Slovak Rep. 0.098 0.394 0.393 
The models used for calculating the predictions are as:  
Trust = 0.105Knowledge + 0.010Attitudes_towards_knowledge + 0.004General_intelligence + 
0.298Formal_education +0.033Positive_contacts – 0.007Negative_contacts + 0.334Political_context + 
0.141Job_context + 0.031Working_hrs_flexibility + 0.486Employed + 0.070Age + 0.152Health_status + 
0.026Living_with_a_spouse_or_partner – 0.079Presence_of_children + 0.069Born_in_the_country – 
0.209Mother’s_formal_education (clustered by country).  
Trust = 0.103Knowledge + 0.005Attitudes_towards_knowledge + 0.005General_intelligence + 
0.231Formal_education +0.031Positive_contacts – 0.008Negative_contacts + 0.351Political_context + 
0.164Job_context + 0.033Working_hrs_flexibility + 0.535Employed + 0.079Age + 0.157Health_status + 
0.062Living_with_a_spouse_or_partner – 0.120Presence_of_children + 0.017Born_in_the_country – 
0.242Mother’s_formal_education (clustered by country group). 
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Annex A. Robustness Check: The Four Components’ Single Measures 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
The crystallized component  0.391***    0.159*** 
 (0.016)    (0.017) 
The cognition component   0.420***   0.351*** 
  (0.011)   (0.012) 
The contact component    0.206***  0.079*** 
   (0.009)  (0.010) 
The context component     0.432*** 0.347*** 
    (0.014) (0.015) 
Control variables  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Log likelihood 141758.22 -136201.55 -142398.79 -131832.62 -133308.62 
Between-class variance 0.226  0.216 0.290  0.266  0.284  
 (0.055) (0.037) (0.054) (0.039) (0.042) 
Number of level 2 units 20 20 20 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 98,729 98,729 98,729 98,729 98,729 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The list of controls includes the full set of variables from the social trust base 
model. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Annex B. Robustness Check: Variations in the Sample Size 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
The crystallized component     
Knowledge to trust  0.078*** 0.080*** 0.093*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) 
Attitudes towards knowledge -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
The cognition component     
General intelligence  0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Formal education  0.310*** 0.322*** 0.188*** 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) 
The contact component     
Positive contacts 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.029*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Negative contacts -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
The context component     
Political context  0.376*** 0.393*** 0.366*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) 
Job context 0.091*** 0.096*** 0.110*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) 
Working hours flexibility 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -86723.956 -100005.380 -59917.114 
Between-class variance 0.386  0.437  0.371 
 (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) 
Number of level 2 units 20 20 20 
Number of level 1 units 66,682 77,941 46,123 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The list of controls includes the full set of variables from the social trust base 
model. In Column (1), we restrict our sample to the employed individuals since many of our operationalisations are 
employment-related. In Column (2), we restrict our sample to people aged between 20 and 65 to avoid a bias caused 
by the fact that the majority of young people between 16 and 20 are still being educated and hence those in the labor 
market might not be representative of the young population (Hanushek, Woessman, & Zhang, 2011). In Column (3), 
we follow Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) and restrict our analysis to male employees since the effects of learning for 
women require a different modelling approach. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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Annex C. Robustness Check: Controlling for the Endogeneity Problem  
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
The crystallized component      
Knowledge to trust  1.262*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.057*** 
 (0.151) (0.003) (0.005) (0.012) 
Attitudes towards knowledge -1.093*** 0.002 0.001 -0.044*** 
 (0.330) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
The cognition component      
General intelligence  0.015*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
 (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Formal education  1.078 0.688*** 0.049** 0.037 
 (0.314) (0.084) (0.019) (0.025) 
The contact component      
Positive contacts 0.165*** 0.029*** 0.011** 0.027*** 
 (0.051) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) 
Negative contacts 0.103*** -0.005*** -0.011** -0.101*** 
 (0.036) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) 
The context component      
Political context  0.465*** 0.227*** 0.242*** 0.473*** 
 (0.086) (0.003) (0.004) (0.038) 
Job context 0.233*** 0.048*** 0.128*** 0.964*** 
 (0.063) (0.003) (0.007) (0.076) 
Working hours flexibility 0.234*** 0.028*** 0.049*** 2.304*** 
 (0.076) (0.003) (0.004) (0.168) 
Observations 60,132 98,729 48,311 89,646 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Column (1) contains the results of an instrumental variable (IV) 
regression, in which the knowledge to trust variable is instrumented with an individual’s working hours per week 
and countries’ mean values for respondents’ altruism levels. The altruism variable is operationalised through the 
question asking the extent to which respondents agree that it is important to help other people and care about others’ 
well-being. The European Social Survey (ESS) data from the year 2012 are used as a source for altruism. Column 
(2) reports the results for an IV regression, in which the cognition component is instrumented with the mother’s 
immigration background and the respondent's genetics measured through the mother's level of education (Cunha & 
Heckman, 2008). Column (3) instruments the contact component with the following set of PIAAC variables: the 
respondent’s work experience length in years, managerial responsibilities, the intensity of computer use at work, the 
need for further training, the size of job company, and the respondent’s job industry code. Column (4) instruments 
the contextual component with the Freedom House civil liberties index (as in Fidrmuc, 2003) and countries’ morale 
culture calculated as the average of responses to two ESS questions about the extent to which the individual 
considers it wrong to (1) make an exaggerated or false insurance claim and (2) buy something they think might be 
stolen. In addition, we include a dummy specifying whether the respondent has a paid job. 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests).
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 Figure 1. A 4C-Component Model of Trust Formation 
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Figure 2. Grouping of Countries Included in the Sample, Derived from the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis  
Note:  Dendrogram using Ward Method. 
 
                                 Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine 
 
        C A S E          0         5        10        15        20        25 
  Label                  +---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 
  Poland                  ─┐ 
  Slovak Republic         ─┼─────┐ 
  Czech Republic          ─┤     │ 
  France                  ─┤     ├───┐ 
  Russian Federation      ─┘     │   │ 
  Japan                   ───┬───┘   │ 
  Korea                   ───┘       ├───────┐ 
  Ireland                 ─┬───┐     │       │ 
  UK                      ─┘   │     │       │ 
  Belgium                 ─┐   ├─────┘       ├─────────────────────────────┐ 
  Germany                 ─┤   │             │                             │ 
  Estonia                 ─┼───┘             │                             │ 
  Netherlands             ─┘                 │                             │ 
  Italy                   ─┬─────────────────┘                             │ 
  Spain                   ─┘                                               │ 
  Finland                 ─┐                                               │ 
  Sweden                  ─┤                                               │ 
  Denmark                 ─┼───────────────────────────────────────────────┘ 
  Norway                  ─┤ 
  USA                     ─┘ 
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Figure 3. A Four Dimensional Visualization of Country Grouping  
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